Following Assad's Departure: Is It Possible forHTS, an Former Extremist Faction, to Govern Syria?
Damascus surrenders with minimal resistance from the regime. Times sometimes bring history to an end with a soft sigh instead of a loud explosion.
Syria stands on the precipice of change. The Assad regime, boasting decades of power and bolstered by Russian jets and Iranian proxies, appears to be crumbling not with the roar of cannons but with a quiet murmur. Once-impregnable Damascus, under the control of the Assad family for over half a century, now falls under the control of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). Led by Abu Mohammed al-Jolani—a figure formerly linked to al-Qaeda and labeled a terrorist by the US, EU, and UN—HTS rises from the ashes of global jihadism to claim leadership of the Syrian state. Just weeks ago, such a transformation seemed impossible.
The transition from insurgency to governance seldom follows a straightforward process—a truth I discovered through my research on Syrian rebel governance during my PhD studies and through my work as a journalist with the BBC and as a researcher at SWP Berlin. In Idlib, HTS's Syrian Salvation Government (SSG) served as a testing ground for administration, providing electricity, sanitation, and bread to the war-weary inhabitants. Such actions demonstrated the potential for administration beyond the battlefield, indicating a shift towards pragmatism. However, what worked in one corner of Syria—in a controlled environment with a relatively homogenous population—may not work for a nation of 18 million people, half displaced, and divided along sectarian, ethnic, and political lines. Syria is not a blank slate. A Christian priest can still lead services in Aleppo, while Kurds retain a measure of autonomy in the northeast, and the atrocities committed by ISIS and Assad's prisons continue to haunt the national psyche.
Administering a single province is distinct from ruling a nation. My research revealed that three major challenges confront any faction attempting to take control of Damascus. The first challenge is legitimacy: managing the basics like infrastructure and maintaining order in Aleppo was achievable for HTS, but governing a multifaceted population and managing central institutions will require constitutional protections, trust in the courts, and safeguards for minorities. The second challenge is international recognition: Jolani objects to being labeled a terrorist, arguing that such designations are "politically motivated and unjust." However, foreign capitals, investors, and NGOs remain wary of engaging with a group with a history of armed jihad. Changing perceptions will require more than just words. The third challenge is internal opposition: HTS once maintained control through force, imprisoning and torturing activists. Now, it must allow room for dissent, ensuring that its gestures towards women's rights and religious freedom translate into tangible reforms rather than mere posturing.
Over the past weeks, HTS advanced through Aleppo, Hama, and Homs with unexpected ease as Assad's forces withdrew. Russia and Iran, once staunch supporters, now seem disinterested in salvaging a sinking ship. Arab states that half-heartedly welcomed Assad back to their diplomatic circle now scramble for a coherent response. Meanwhile, Western governments express skepticism about HTS's transformation, and global consultancies and sovereign funds are cautious. The region's economic and strategic significance as a hub for trade corridors and energy routes lingers in the background, but investing in a state led by a man with a $10 million bounty on his head is hardly an attractive prospect.
Jolani's rhetorical shift is unmistakable: "What we propose is a governance aligned with the traditions of this region," he declares, emphasizing that "no one has the right to erase another group." Permitting women to go unveiled and allowing Christians to conduct services freely—these are indications of a newfound pragmatism. However, the gap between image and institution is vast. To expand the relative stability achieved in Idlib to an entire nation, HTS must integrate rival factions, respect religious and ethnic diversity, and give local communities a say in their own affairs. Without genuine power-sharing, it risks repeating the same authoritarian model it claims to replace.
Drawing Comparisons with SDF and FSA: Lessons from the Field
Precedents offer lessons and warnings. The Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces established an impressive local order with U.S. backing, but did not aspire to rule all of Syria. The Turkey-backed Syrian National Army grappled with factionalism and corruption. ISIS's so-called caliphate brought only brutality. HTS's hybrid approach—part ideological, part technocratic—held Idlib together, but can it navigate a far more intricate landscape without resorting to its repressive past? If it can draft a constitution that protects minorities, dismantle the tools of terrorism, and secure at least some grudging acceptance, it may pave the way for reconstruction efforts and the return of refugees.
The stakes extend beyond Syria's borders. If HTS delivers stability and a semblance of fairness, refugees scattered throughout Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, and even Europe might reconsider returning. Reconstruction, trade, and infrastructure projects could rejuvenate the region's economy. However, if oppression and retribution characterize this new order, another mass exodus and fresh waves of violence await. As foreign capitals weigh their responses, they remember how often insurgent leaders have promised tolerance, only to revert to cruelty once in power.
The path ahead for HTS is narrow and steep. HTS needs to move past its insurgent past, building genuine trust with Syrians and the global community. If they can manage to meet three key challenges—establishing government through inclusion, earning international recognition by implementing significant reforms, and handling internal opposition through genuine tolerance and accountability—they could transition from a military group to a crucial player in determining Syria's future. If they fail, they risk contributing another sad chapter to a nation that has been defined by deception and despair for far too long.
The ink is still drying on the page. Members of the investment world, diplomats, intelligence agents, and humanitarian organizers are all keeping a close eye. Neighboring countries, such as Turkey, Israel, the Gulf states, and Europe, are all quietly reassessing their approaches. The question now is whether Syria's subsequent chapter will be penned by a group that earlier depended on ideology and terrorism as its primary resources, or a transformed entity capable of guiding a wounded nation back from the edge.
Syria's future is teetering on a precipice. The options aren't perfect, but they are choices we're currently facing. As garbage collectors replace militants in Syria's streets, we're either witnessing the emergence of a new Syrian state or the prelude to its following crisis.
- Despite its historical control, Damascus under the Syrian Salvation Government (SSG) led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) is a significant shift, marking a new era in Syria's history.
- The post-Assad Syria is expected to face significant challenges in governance, including legitimacy, international recognition, and internal opposition, which the Syrian Salvation Government must address.
- Turkey, as a neighboring country, is closely watching the transition in Syria following the fall of Assad's regime and the rise of HTS, reassessing its approach to the region's situation.
- The future of Syria is teetering on a precipice, with the Syrian Salvation Government's potential transformation into a responsible and just entity or a return to its insurgent ways, which could lead to another crisis in the nation.
- The international community is keeping a close eye on the evolution of the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, as Syria's future largely hinges on whether the group can effectively navigate the challenges of governance and trust-building to guide the nation towards recovery and stability.
